FTR manipulation occurs when a trader places virtual bids that shift day ahead congestion at a node and so raise the value of financial transmission rights (FTRs) held at that node. In one case, a desk in the Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO) market lost money on virtual trades at the Velva node in North Dakota while earning more on FTRs at the same node.
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Office of Enforcement concluded that the combination was manipulation (3). The MISO market monitor identified the pattern and referred the case to FERC (3). Firms that trade both FTRs and virtuals are exposed to the same risk.
FTR manipulation risk is rising where demand is growing
PJM Interconnection, the grid operator for all or part of 13 states and Washington, D.C., expects summer peak demand to rise from 160 GW in 2025 to 253 GW by 2046, driven mainly by data centers, with four zones accounting for 74% of annual growth over the period (1). Concentrated load growth increases flows on a small number of transmission paths. PJM and MISO already generated more than 91% of FTR profit between June 2025 and May 2026, according to Yes Energy (2).
FTRs and virtuals settle on the same congestion
An FTR pays the day ahead congestion difference between a source and a sink, while a virtual bid (also called a convergence bid, INC or DEC) clears in the day ahead market and settles in real time. A virtual position at the right node can impact day ahead congestion, which feeds directly into FTR settlement.
Most firms hold the two in separate books with different owners, reports and alert rules. Reviewed separately, a losing virtual book and a winning FTR book appear unrelated. Net profit and loss by node can show that they form one strategy.
How Louis Dreyfus lost on virtuals and won more on FTRs
FERC’s Office of Enforcement found that Louis Dreyfus Energy Services used virtual trades at the Velva node to raise congestion and lift the value of its FTR positions. After April 2009, average daily FTR positions rose from about 118,000 MWh to more than 309,000 MWh by December and the daily virtual trading limit rose fourfold, while the share of virtual trades that helped the FTR positions rose from 51% to 80% (3).
Virtual losses at Velva were more than offset by FTR profit, and Enforcement attributed $3.334 million of that profit to the virtual activity. Enforcement also found no support for the firm’s claim that it traded on market fundamentals, and the firm settled in 2014 without admitting or denying the violations, with $3.334 million in disgorgement plus $383,743 in interest and a civil penalty of $4,072,257 (3).
Two other FERC matters show how the agency tests conduct against intent: Constellation Energy Commodities Group in NYISO, which settled in 2012 for a $135 million civil penalty and $110 million in disgorgement, and GreenHat Energy in PJM (4)(5). BroadPeak’s whitepaper on FTR and congestion monitoring sets out the evidence FERC relied on in each case.
Why standard trade surveillance misses FTR and virtual manipulation
Most of the exposure comes from three gaps in surveillance. FTR holdings arrive from ISO portals, virtual bids come from bidding tools and physical positions sit in the energy trading and risk management (ETRM) system, so few surveillance tools see all three together. Alert rules built for spoofing or wash trades check one product at a time, so they never ask whether a position in one product pays off in another. Size thresholds add noise, since a small group of participants legitimately holds most FTR exposure and a size alert on a large PJM holder says little about intent.
Current alert rules rarely test for intent, although intent can be measured. One signal is the share of virtual trades that helped an FTR position at the same node, which moved by 29 percentage points in the Louis Dreyfus data (3).
A $3.3 million FTR manipulation gain cost $7.8 million
FERC attributed $3.334 million of FTR profit to the pattern, and Louis Dreyfus paid about $7.8 million in disgorgement, interest and penalty combined, which is more than twice that profit, before counting legal fees and staff time spent on the investigation (3). The Constellation order also required ongoing record retention, trading documentation and reporting, and barred the firm from employing certain traders (4).
The investigation also creates internal costs. When a regulator or monitor asks for the full picture at a node, teams pull files from three or four systems and rebuild the history by hand, which takes analyst time and leaves room for error.
BroadPeak’s whitepaper sets out the data and rules needed to close the gap.
FTR awards and virtual trades linked on the same corridor
BroadPeak’s Power Market Surveillance solution loads FTR auction award data from MISO, PJM, CAISO, ERCOT, NYISO, ISO New England and SPP into one platform and links it to node level virtual transactions loaded through bid to bill, so awards and virtuals on the same corridor can be reviewed together. Concentration analysis shows where exposure sits by ISO, path and participant, and an interactive map geo tags nodes and color codes paths by trade type (7).
With real time prices loaded, the platform tracks each trade from bid to settlement and flags divergences between day ahead and real time spreads that may indicate manipulation. Forfeiture scanning enables users to identify activity that may have led to a forfeiture line item in their settlement statement within the tool rather than having to recreate the activity across disparate systems and reports. Thresholds are configurable (7).
What a regulator may ask a trading desk
- Can you show net profit and loss by node across FTR positions, virtual trades and up to congestion (UTC) trades for any period?
- Does one system or one team see FTR and virtual activity together?
- Would you find a pattern before the ISO market monitor does?
Common questions about FTR and virtual surveillance
How can FTRs be used to manipulate markets?
FERC’s Office of Enforcement found in the Louis Dreyfus case that virtual trades at a node raised congestion and lifted the value of FTR positions at the same node (3). FERC found a different pattern in the GreenHat case, where FTR positions were built with little collateral, the few profitable positions were sold and the firm defaulted on the rest, and the case settled in 2022 (5)(6).
Who monitors FTR and virtual trading?
Independent market monitors review participant behavior in each ISO and refer suspected manipulation to FERC, as the MISO market monitor did in the Louis Dreyfus case (3). Firms still need to supervise their own desks.
What data does FTR surveillance need?
It needs FTR positions, virtual and UTC bids and clears, nodal congestion prices, and physical load and generation, all linked by node and time, along with the written rationale for large FTR positions.
What is up to congestion trading (UTC)?
In PJM’s day ahead market, an up to congestion (UTC) trade is a spread between two nodes with no physical power behind it. It behaves more like an FTR than a conventional virtual, so surveillance should test it against both FTR and virtual positions.
What rule prohibits FTR and virtual trading manipulation? FERC’s rule against market manipulation (18 C.F.R. § 1c.2), adopted under the Energy Policy Act of 2005, prohibits any scheme to defraud in connection with FERC jurisdictional transactions, which covers FTR, virtual and UTC trading in ISO markets.
Source
- PJM Interconnection, 2026 Long-Term Load Forecast Report; Modo Energy, PJM 2026 load forecast
- Yes Energy, FTR market performance and trends review, June 2025 to May 2026
- FERC order, MISO virtual and FTR trading, Louis Dreyfus Energy Services
- Troutman Energy Report, Constellation settlement
- FERC, All civil penalty actions 2021, GreenHat Energy order assessing civil penalties, 177 FERC ¶ 61,073
- Utility Dive, GreenHat Energy and traders to pay $181M to settle PJM market manipulation allegations
- BroadPeak Power Market Surveillance solution